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Abstract 
 
This article will examine the definition of disability developed by the 
European Court of Justice for the purposes of the Employment Equality 
Directive and examine whether it is sufficient for the purpose of bringing 
People Living with HIV/AIDS within its scope. The article will argue that 
in order to adequately protect People Living with HIV/AIDS within the 
EU from discrimination, the European Court of Justice needs to ensure that 
a coherent EU wide definition of disability, based fully upon the social 
model of disability, is adopted. This is necessary in order to ensure 
adequate protection not only for People Living with HIV/AIDS but for all 
individuals with disabilities from discrimination throughout the EU. In 
addition to this central argument, this paper will argue that the lack of a 
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coherent definition of disability grounded in the social model fragments 
protection for People Living with HIV/AIDS across the EU leading to a 
number of possible unintended consequences. 
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Introduction 
 
Despite the fact that there are approximately 80 million individuals with 
disabilities within the European Union (“EU”), there is no coherent 
definition of disability (European Commission, 2010). There is also no 
clear consensus amongst Member States as to the question of whether 
People Living with HIV/AIDS (“PLHA”) should be defined as “disabled” 
and thus acquire the various legal protections associated with such a 
designation. This article will examine the definition of disability developed 
by recent decisions of the European Court of Justice for the purposes of 
the Employment Equality Directive (Council Directive 2000/78/EC) and 
examine whether it is sufficient for the purpose of bringing PLHA within 
its scope. This paper will argue that in order to adequately protect PLHA 
within the EU, the European Court of Justice (“CJEU”) needs to ensure 
that a coherent EU wide definition of disability, based upon the social 
model of disability, is adopted. Such a definition is necessary in order to 
ensure adequate protection not only for PLHA but for all individuals from 
disability discrimination throughout the EU. Finally it should be noted 
that, for the purposes of brevity, the increasingly relevant provisions of the 
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European Convention on Human Rights will not be discussed by this 
article. 
 
In some ways, PLHA represent the “front line” in the ideological 
battle concerning the definition of disability at an EU level and the 
question concerning the relationship between sickness and disability as 
will be seen by the Advocate General’s opinion in the recent HK Danmark 
(Ring and Skouboe Werge)1 case concerning unlawful discrimination 
within employment.  
 
HIV represents a major public health problem for Europe. It has 
been estimated that there are approximately 2.2 million people living with 
the virus in the WHO European Region; approaching 1 million in the 
European Union (UNAIDS, 2010) and 1.4 million in Eastern Europe and 
central Asia (Hamers & Phillips, 2008). However, due to the fact that HIV 
does not generally produce symptoms which lead to diagnosis around the 
time of infection, these figures are mere estimates. There are many PLHA 
who are unaware of their HIV and who have not been diagnosed. 
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According to Hamers & Philips (2008) it is estimated that as many as one-
third of PLHA in the EU are unaware of their HIV status and in some 
eastern European countries up to 60% of PLHA are undiagnosed. This is 
borne out by the figures which show that although an estimated 107,800 
people were living with HIV in the UK in 2013, approximately one quarter 
of these were undiagnosed and unaware of their infection (Public Health 
England, 2014). In terms of composition in the UK, HIV is largely 
concentrated amongst already marginalised groups namely gay, bisexual 
men and other men who have sex with men and black-African 
heterosexual men and women. By way of example, of the estimated 
107,800 people were living with HIV in the UK in 2013, 43,500  were 
men who have sex with men and 38,700 were black-African (Public 
Health England, 2014). 
 
HIV damages the immune system, leaving the infected person 
vulnerable to a variety of infections (called "opportunistic" infections to 
indicate that they arise in the setting of immune impairment). However 
having HIV does not mean that an individual has AIDS and, with early 
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HIV diagnosis and access to effective treatment most PLHA will never 
progress to a diagnosis of AIDS. Indeed evidence now indicates that due to 
improved treatment options PLHA can be expected to live into their early 
seventies, a life expectancy approaching that of the general population 
(Samji et al., 2013, Sterne, 2005). 
 
The marginalised nature of the vast majority of PLHA, for example 
their status as men who have sex with men, and the need to protect such 
individuals from discrimination has led to a plethora of legislation. This 
emanates from a variety of sources: international, European and domestic. 
Whilst each has at its heart the objective of protecting PLHA from 
discrimination the collective result is a multifaceted collection of various 
pieces of legislation, often overlapping and sometimes contradictory. From 
a specifically legal perspective, HIV and AIDS have provoked a range of 
interventions. In some countries, PLHA benefit from general anti-
discrimination legislation. By way of example, in the Netherlands and 
Latvia, PLHA benefit from the general constitutional prohibition of 
discrimination. In others anti-discrimination provisions expressly refer to 
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HIV/AIDS as a separate protected status or are included in special laws 
dealing with the prevention and control of HIV. In others still, PLHA are 
protected under disability laws which either expressly include HIV in the 
definition of a disability or have been interpreted to that effect. By way of 
example, in the United Kingdom paragraph 6 to Schedule 1 of the Equality 
Act 2010 states that HIV is deemed to be a disability. 
 
As such the EU, its institutions and Member States are faced with a 
quandary as to the exact definition, description and classification of HIV. 
This paper will now identify and analyse the overlapping legal frameworks 
and definitions facing the CJEU when asked to decide cases involving 
unlawful discrimination directed towards individuals with disabilities and, 
in particular, PLHA. It will then proceed to examine the emerging 
jurisprudence of the CJEU in this area before examining the possible 
implications of recent decision for PLHA. 
 
Primary and secondary legislation of the European Union 
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The starting point in relation to a consideration of the legal framework 
prohibiting discrimination within the European Union is Article 19 of the 
Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the functioning of the European 
Union (“TFEU”). This provides: 
 
“Without prejudice to the other provisions of the Treaties and 
within the limits of the powers conferred by them upon the Union, 
the Council, acting unanimously in accordance with a special 
legislative procedure and after obtaining the consent of the 
European Parliament, may take appropriate action to combat 
discrimination based on sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or 
belief, disability, age or sexual orientation.” 
 
There is no explicit mention of an individual’s HIV status in 
Article 19 TFEU nor any opportunity to expand the closed list of 
prohibited grounds. Yet despite this the European Union has committed 
itself to combating discrimination against PLHA. In February 2004 
representatives of governments from Europe and central Asia met at a 
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conference in Dublin and outlined their commitments to combatting HIV 
in a set of 33 objectives. The resulting document known as the Dublin 
Declaration commits Member States to: 
 
“combat stigma and discrimination of people living with HIV/AIDS 
in Europe and Central Asia, including through a critical review 
and monitoring of existing legislation, policies and practices with 
the objective of promoting the effective enjoyment of all rights for 
people living with HIV/AIDS and members of affected 
communities.”  (at para. 20)  
 
This is reaffirmed in the European Union’s Vilnius Declaration of 
2004 where there is a commitment on the part of Member States to 
“continue to develop and implement relevant legislation, in particular with 
a view to prohibiting discrimination, inter alia in employment, on the 
grounds of HIV status”.  Despite these commitments, discrimination 
provisions in EU law fail to explicitly include HIV status. The 
consequence of this is that Member States are free to choose either to 
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protect or not to protect PLHA from discrimination, and that PLHA must 
therefore seek protection from discrimination on the grounds that their 
condition constitutes a disability. 
 
Due to the scope of Directives adopted in order to combat 
discrimination within the EU, protection from discrimination on the 
grounds of disability is less far reaching than protection from 
discrimination in relation to other grounds. By way of example, the Racial 
Equality Directive 2000/43/EC (2000) protects individuals from 
discrimination upon the ground of racial and ethnic origin in a number of 
fields including employment, social protection, social advantages, 
education and access to and supply of goods and services. In addition, the 
Gender Goods and Services Directive 2004/113/EC (2004) was introduced 
in order to expand the scope of equality on the grounds of gender to goods 
and services. However protection from discrimination on the grounds of 
disability is more restricted in scope due to the fact that the relevant 
Directive, the Employment Equality Directive 2000/78/EC (2000) (“the 
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Framework Directive”), only provides protection against discrimination in 
the fields of employment, occupation and vocational training. 
 
Article 2(1) of the Framework Directive provides: 
 
“For the purposes of this Directive, the principle of equal 
treatment shall mean that there shall be no direct or indirect 
discrimination whatsoever on any of the grounds referred to in 
Article 1.” 
 
The grounds referred to in Article 1 are religion or belief, 
disability, age and sexual orientation. Rather unsatisfactorily, the 
Framework Directive provides no definition of disability. This has the 
potential to permit multiple varying definitions of disability to be adopted 
across the EU and for different domestic courts to adopt differing 
approaches as to whether a particular impairment constitutes a “disability”. 
For example, in relation to PLHA, there is no guarantee that they will be 
afforded uniform protection across the EU.  
 12 
 
 
The European Court of Justice’s emerging jurisprudence 
In the seminal case of Chacon Navas v Eurest Colectividades SA2 
the CJEU offered guidance on the issue of how to define “disability” for 
the purposes of the Framework Directive stating at para 43 that: 
 
“[The Framework Directive] aims to combat certain types of 
discrimination as regards employment and occupation. In that 
context, the concept of ‘disability’ must be understood as referring 
to a limitation which results in particular from physical, mental or 
psychological impairments and which hinders the participation of 
the person concerned in professional life.” 
 
Importantly in Chacón Navas, the CJEU held that workers do not 
fall within the scope of the protection afforded by the Framework 
Directive as soon as they develop any type of sickness and so made an 
important distinction between sickness and disability. In addition, it was 
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strongly stated that sickness cannot be regarded as a separate prohibited 
ground of discrimination for the purposes of the Framework Directive. 
It was against this backdrop that the judgment in the case of HK 
Danmark (Ring and Skouboe Werge)3 was delivered by the CJEU. In HK 
Danmark (Ring and Skouboe Werge), Danish legislation permitted 
businesses to dismiss those who had been off ill for a certain number of 
days with only one month's notice, shorter than the notice normally 
required under Danish employment law.  The case was brought by two 
applicants one of whom, Ms. Ring, had developed back pain. The second 
applicant, Ms. Werge, had whiplash following a road accident. Crucially, 
both applicants were still able to work but were unable to work on a full-
time basis. 
 
The applicants argued that they had a disability, and that this 
reduced notice period was unlawful disability discrimination, in breach of 
the EU Framework Directive. A question of fundamental importance was 
whether or not they fell within the definition of disability as expounded by 
the Chacon Navas4 case. The employers disputed that the applicants’ state 
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of health was covered by the concept of “disability” within the meaning of 
the Framework Directive, since the only incapacity that affected them was 
that they were now not able to work full-time. As such it was argued by 
the employers that as they could work part-time they were not excluded 
completely from participating in professional life and so fell outside the 
Chacon Navas definition. The employer’s central argument was that 
disability, as constructed by the decision in Chacon Navas, implies a 
complete exclusion from work or professional life as opposed to the partial 
exclusion here. 
  
The CJEU disagreed and placed strong emphasis on the United 
Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (“the UN 
Convention”). The UN Convention was adopted by the UN General 
Assembly in December 2006, following prolonged lobbying by disability 
rights activists. It entered into force in May 2008 and was ratified by the 
European Union in 2010. The ratification of the UN Convention by the 
European Union thus followed the Chacon Navas decision and 
accordingly it clearly follows from Article 216(2) TFEU that international 
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agreements concluded by the European Union are binding upon the 
institutions of the European Union and on its Member States. Thus, the 
concept of disability within the meaning of the Framework Directive 
should not fall short of the scope of the protection afforded by the UN 
Convention.  
 
The UN Convention itself does not include a definition of 
"disability" or "persons with disabilities". However the Convention's 
preamble recognizes that "disability is an evolving concept and that 
disability results from the interaction between persons with impairments 
and attitudinal and environmental barriers that hinders their full and 
effective participation in society on an equal basis with others". 
 
Article 1 of the UN Convention further states: "Persons with 
disabilities include those who have long term physical, mental, intellectual 
or sensory impairments which in interaction with various barriers may 
hinder their full and effective participation in society on an equal basis 
with others." 
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Models of disability 
 
At this point, in order to adequately understand the social construction of 
the relevant legal framework, it is important to consider how disability 
itself has been socially constructed. It is generally accepted that there are 
two dominant models of disability, namely the medical model of disability 
and the social model of disability.   
 
This medical model locates disability within the individual. 
Disability is a medical condition and consequently, like all other 
conditions it can be treated by doctors to ensure that its symptoms are, 
ultimately, alleviated or eradicated.  According to Parsons (1958) the 
nature of the model is that, from a social perspective, the disabled 
individual is placed in the sick role. Drimmer (1992) asserts that this role 
contains four key elements. Firstly, the sick person is not held responsible 
for their illness – it is due to biological factors over which they have no 
control. Following on from this primary tenet, it is advanced that (2) the 
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sick person is exempted from normal social obligations and (3) is in a 
socially legitimate position if (4) they co-operate with medical 
professionals in order to work towards recovery. 
 
One of the leading academic commentators on disability, Michael 
Oliver, has been highly critical of this model of disability. He contends 
that there are two fundamental aspects to the medical model of disability. 
Firstly, it locates the “problem” of disability within the individual and 
secondly, it sees the causes of this problem as stemming from the 
functional limitations or psychological losses which are assumed to arise 
from disability (Oliver, 1996).  Furthermore, the medical model has been 
subjected to substantial criticism by disabled individuals themselves. They 
contend that it is, in fact, society which disables physically impaired 
people as “[d]isability is something imposed on top of our impairments by 
the way which we are unnecessarily isolated and excluded from full 
participation in society” (UPIAS, 1976). Further criticism derives from 
that fact that a cure for many disabilities may never be found; and in any 
event, persons with disabilities are quite capable of participating in society 
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and the practices of confinement that accompany the sick role are 
unacceptable (Kaplan, 1999). To combat these inadequacies, the use of a 
social model of disability has been advocated by many commentators.  
 
According to the social model, disability is any societal factor 
which imposes restrictions on disabled people. These can range from 
individual prejudice to institutional discrimination and from inaccessible 
public buildings to inaccessible transport systems (Oliver, 1996). As 
Wendell (1996: 46) notes: 
 
“The cultural habit of regarding the condition of the person, not 
the built environment or the social organization of activities, as the 
source of the problem, runs deep. For example, it took me several 
years of struggling with the heavy door to my building, sometimes 
having to wait until a person came along, to realize that the door 
was an accessibility problem, not only for me, but for others as 
well. And I did not notice, until one of my students pointed it out, 
that the lack of signs that could be read from a distance at my 
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university forced people with mobility impairments to expand a lot 
of energy unnecessarily, searching for rooms and offices. I 
interpreted it, automatically, as a problem arising from my illness 
(as I did with the door), rather than as a problem arising from the 
built environment that has been created for too narrow a range of 
people and situations.” 
 
HIV clearly fits more comfortably within the social model due to 
high levels of stigma faced by PLHA. At its most basic stigma can be 
characterized as the negative perceptions of so-called normal people to all 
individuals who are different from themselves (English, 1977). However 
academic and policy discussions of stigma, particularly in relation to HIV 
and AIDS, concentrate on Goffman’s work (Goffman, 1963). Goffman’s 
research draws upon the  experience of people suffering from mental 
illness, possessing physical deformities, or practicing what were perceived 
to be socially deviant behaviours such as homosexuality or criminal 
behaviour and defines stigma as ‘‘an attribute that is significantly 
discrediting’’ and which serves to reduce social standing of the person 
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who possesses it. He identifies three bases of stigma. First, abominations 
of the body. Second, blemishes of individual character and third tribal 
stigma, due to an individual’s membership of a despised group in society. 
Watt (1996) advances that stigmatization of individuals with HIV rests 
upon all three of Goffman’s bases and consequently stigma is more 
pronounced. Building on this theory Conyers, Boomer and McMahon 
(2005) assert that two main theories assist us in explaining the unique level 
of discrimination and stigma directed at PLHA. The first centres upon the 
characteristics of the virus itself, with significant focus placed upon the 
fact that it is currently a potentially fatal infectious disease with no cure. 
The second relates to the marginalized nature of the vast majority of 
PLHA, e.g. their status as intravenous drug users, men who have sex with 
men or members of ethnic minorities. Thus commentators like Watt (1996) 
advance that discrimination against PLHA is often related to pre-existing 
stigma which makes PLHA particularly vulnerable to discrimination. The 
virus is thus socially disabling and the fear of stigma often prevents PLHA 
from accessing full legal protection by, for example, failing to disclose 
their condition to their employer.  
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Returning to the UN Convention, by the language employed in 
both the preamble and Article 1, it is clear that it adopts the social model. 
This use of the social model of disability, which shall be discussed later, is 
ground-breaking and has the potential to empower individuals with 
disabilities and PLHA on a global basis. Indeed it clearly influenced the 
thinking and decision of the CJEU in the HK Danmark (Ring and Skouboe 
Werge)5 case. Referring explicitly to the UN Convention, the CJEU felt 
that:  
 
“the concept of ‘disability’ must be understood as referring to a 
limitation which results in particular from physical, mental or 
psychological impairments which in interaction with various 
barriers may hinder the full and effective participation of the 
person concerned in professional life on an equal basis with other 
workers.” (at para 38). 
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The impairment does not have to completely hinder, or exclude, an 
individual from participation in professional life but rather be one which 
may hinder full and effective participation in professional life. 
 
Even though HK Danmark (Ring and Skouboe Werge) appears to 
lower the bar, it nevertheless remains high for PLHA. Thus, due to the 
progressive nature of the disease it is questionable whether PLHA will 
fulfil the CJEU’s conceptual requirement of “disability” at the point of 
their diagnosis. If a purely functional approach to the question of 
“participation in professional life” is taken then the majority of PLHA face 
no functional or imitational barriers to participation in professional life. 
They can, to the naked eye, participate on exactly the same terms and meet 
the same functional requirements as fellow professionals without HIV. 
Unlike wheelchair users they are not disabled by any physical features of 
their employer’s premises, for example steps or heavy doors. However, at 
the point of diagnosis, stigma and the fear of discrimination combine to 
significantly hinder the full and effective participation of PLHA in 
professional life on an equal basis with their fellow workers. This is 
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evidenced by research carried out by Fesko (2001). Fesko reviewed the 
workplace experiences and disclosure decisions of eighteen PLHA in 
depth and discovered that six of the participants were completely open 
about their HIV status within the workplace. Seven individuals had 
revealed their status to selected people in the workplace and, at the point of 
doing so, requested that the information be kept confidential. Finally, five 
individuals reported that they did not tell anyone in their workplace. 
Individuals identified the stigma associated with HIV as being a factor in 
their decision to disclose and some felt that they might disclose in future if 
the stigma associated with the disease were reduced. In addition, 
participants also described multiple levels of stigma associated with 
homosexual orientation or membership of an ethnic minority group. By 
way of example, one African-American woman described her work 
environment in the following terms: 
 
“With my boss, he was a joker – jokes around and stuff like that – 
but they had a lot of semi-gay bashing and they raised some very 
nasty little jokes that I didn’t care for, and people were joking 
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around and by me being black and it was an all-white company I 
was working for, I decided not to tell.” (Fesko, 2001: 239) 
 
This fear of stigma and the potential inability to disclose means 
that, across the EU, numerous PLHA are unable to request that reasonable 
accommodations be made to their working environment because of the fact 
they have not disclosed their status to their employer. Such a fact could 
have detrimental effects on a PLHA’s health and their participation in 
professional life should they become ill. By way of example, in the 
absence of disclosure and reasonable accommodations being made PLHA 
may miss hospital appointments if such appointments fall during working 
hours or opt to not take doses of medication whilst at work for fear of 
possible awkward questioning by fellow workers. 
 
HIV was mentioned by Advocate General Kokott in her opinion in 
HK Danmark (Ring and Skouboe Werge) when referring to the express 
distinction between sickness and disability that the CJEU had earlier 
drawn in Chacon Navas, she stated: 
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“33.      A distinction must therefore be drawn between sickness as 
the possible cause of the impairment and the impairment resulting 
from sickness. A permanent limitation resulting from sickness 
which hinders participation in professional life is also covered by 
the protection of the directive. 
 
… 
 
35.      There is nothing in the wording of Directive 2000/78 to 
indicate that its scope of application is limited to a certain degree 
of severity of disability. Since, however, this issue has been neither 
raised by the referring court nor discussed by the parties to the 
proceedings, it does not need to be definitively resolved here.” 
 
The problem HIV presents is that it is not a static condition but one 
that evolves with time. In the early stages of infection, it is stigma 
associated with the virus that is disabling rather than the virus itself.  
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Indeed at the point of diagnosis many PLHA are fit and healthy and, with 
access to appropriate treatment, will remain so for a number of years. 
However if the virus progresses it becomes functionally disabling in 
addition to socially disabling. The virus has the potential to manifest itself 
via AIDS defining illnesses and thus render the individual disabled from 
both a medical and social perspective. It is only at this point that the virus 
becomes disabling from the perspective of the medical model. 
 
A retreat from the social model? 
 
As previously noted, the issue of whether HIV could amount to a 
disability and whether a minimum level of severity is required before an 
impairment can be considered a disability was touched upon by the 
Advocate General in HK Danmark (Ring and Skouboe Werge). Advocate 
General Kokott stated at paragraph 34 that, “The distinction between 
sickness and disability is therefore easier to draw in these cases than in 
the case on which the Supreme Court of the United States of America had 
to rule, where it held that even an asymptomatic HIV infection may 
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constitute a disability within the meaning of the ADA 1990.” The United 
States’ Supreme Court decision referred to is that of Bragdon v Abbott6. In 
this case the claimant, Abbott, disclosed to her dentist that she was HIV 
positive prior to requiring treatment in order to fill a cavity. Abbott’s 
dentist refused to treat her in his office and instead offered to treat her at a 
hospital where she would be responsible for the increased costs associated 
with the use of hospital treatment.  Abbott argued that this treatment 
contravened the Americans with Disabilities Act 1990 (“ADA”) and the 
key legal issue for the Supreme Court was whether PLHA fell within the 
definition of disability under the ADA. The ADA defines disability at 
s1202 as: 
 
"(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the 
major life activities of such individual; 
"(B) a record of such an impairment; or 
"(C) being regarded as having such an impairment."  
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The Supreme Court decided that PLHA did fall within the definition of 
disability for the purposes of the ADA as the virus substantially limited 
one of Bragdon’s major life activities. The Americans with Disabilities 
Act 1990 contains no definition of what constitutes a “major life activity” 
but after referring to medical evidence, the Court concluded that HIV 
substantially limited Bragdon’s ability to reproduce which they considered 
a major life activity. Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Scalia and Justice 
Thomas dissented with the majority of the court on this point, considering 
reproduction not to be a major life activity. In the Supreme Court’s 
opinion although conception and childbirth are not impossible for PLHA, 
the court considered them to be “dangerous to the public health” and so 
amount to a substantial limitation for the purposes of the ADA. 
 
With these facts in mind, it must be questioned whether PLHA will 
be able to fall within the definition of “disability” advanced by the CJEU 
in  for the purposes of the Framework Directive in HK Danmark (Ring and 
Skouboe Werge). Bragdon was able to persuade the Supreme Court that 
she should fall within the remit of the ADA as HIV substantially limited 
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one of her major life activities, her ability to reproduce. Yet clearly a 
restriction on one’s ability to reproduce does not hinder the participation of 
an individual in professional life as required by the CJEU’s functional 
conception of “disability”.  This is where the concept of “disability” 
advanced by the CJEU differs markedly from that employed by the ADA 
as evidenced by the CJEU’s decision in Z. v A Government department 
and The Board of management of a community school7. In this case Ms Z, 
who was employed as a school teacher, had a rare condition which meant 
that she had healthy ovaries but no uterus and so was unable to support a 
pregnancy. In order to become pregnant Ms Z entered into a surrogacy 
arrangement via a Californian agency and a child was born to the surrogate 
on 28 April 2010. Biologically, the child was the genetic child of Ms Z and 
her husband, having been created from their gametes however since Z had 
not been pregnant and could not give birth to a child, she was unable to 
satisfy the requirements under Ireland’s Maternity Protection Act 1994 for 
taking paid maternity leave. She did also not qualify for paid adoptive 
leave, as provided by Ireland’s Adoptive Leave Act 1995, since she was 
not adopting a child born through surrogacy. Ms Z argued before the 
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CJEU that this refusal to allow her to access paid leave amounted to 
discrimination upon, amongst other grounds, disability. Her claim failed as 
the CJEU decided that she did not fall within the definition of disability for 
the purposes of the Framework Directive. The court stated that  “the 
inability to have a child by conventional means does not in itself, in 
principle, prevent the commissioning mother from having access to, 
participating in or advancing in employment. In the present case, it is not 
apparent from the order for reference that Ms Z.’s condition by itself made 
it impossible for her to carry out her work or constituted a hindrance to the 
exercise of her professional activity. In those circumstances, it must be 
held that Ms Z.’s condition does not constitute a ‘disability’” (at paras 81 
& 82). The case of Z  thus illustrates the potential difficulties that PLHA 
may have in persuading the CJEU that they are disabled for the purposes 
of the Framework Directive. In common with Ms Z, PLHA will not be 
able to demonstrate that a restriction upon their ability to have children by 
conventional means hinders their participation in professional life.  Indeed 
provided they are in good health and their medical condition is stable, they 
will face an uphill battle in persuading the CJEU that their condition 
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imposes any hindrance whatsoever upon their participation in professional 
life. This somewhat restrictive construction of the concept of disability has 
been echoed in the later CJEU decision of Fag og Arbejde  v Municipality 
of Billund8 where it was stated that “an illness requiring particular 
attention, continuous medication and control may be a physiological or 
psychological burden to the person concerned, but not render impossible 
the full and effective carrying out of work, or hinder participation on an 
equal basis in professional life in general” (at para. 38). 
 
 
This developing construction of the concept of disability is 
unfortunate as in order to fully embrace the social model future decisions 
of the CJEU need to recognize that the stigma faced by PLHA is disabling 
as it is a factor imposed on top of PLHA’s impairment that serves to 
unnecessarily isolate and exclude them from full participation in society. It 
is hoped that in future the CJEU broaden the concept of disability for the 
purposes of the Framework Directive to encompass individuals who are 
prevented from participating fully and effectively in society and not just, 
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as the law currently stands, professional life. The case of Bragdon9 
illustrates that whilst a condition like HIV may not hinder an individual’s 
functional participation in professional life it certainly is able to limit an 
individual’s full and effective functional participation in society. Indeed, 
the fact that it does hinder functional participation in society only serves to 
exacerbate stigma against PLHA who may be perceived as “other” or 
“different” from the able bodied majority due to their inability to fully 
participate in some aspects of society. This stigma knows no boundaries; it 
exists within the place of work of PLHA and outside of it. The CJEU 
ought to recognize that for the purposes of the Framework Directive 
individuals who are prevented from participating fully and effectively in 
any aspect of society due to stigma, and not just as currently enunciated 
employment, are “disabled” and should fall within the remit of the 
Framework Directive.   
 
In addition, it may be perceived as somewhat troubling as to why 
Advocate General Kokott in the HK Danmark (Ring and Skouboe 
Werge)10 case questioned whether a certain degree of severity of disability 
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is required for the purposes of the Framework Directive. By referring to 
HIV and questioning whether a minimum level of severity is required, 
some might interpret Advocate General Kokott’s comments as failing to 
take into account the fact that PLHA, in common with many other 
individuals with disabilities, face discrimination within employment not 
solely because of functional limitations due to the severity of their 
condition but often because of the substantial stigma associated with their 
condition. Indeed, due to recent medical advances in the treatment of HIV, 
PLHA within employment are now arguably more likely to be 
discriminated against because of the stigma associated with their condition 
as opposed to any functional limitations. By questioning whether a certain 
degree of severity is required and using HIV as an example, it would 
appear that Advocate General Kokott moves the concept of disability away 
from the social model of disability. It is respectfully submitted that the 
focus appears to be solely upon a particular condition’s degree of impact 
upon an individual’s functional ability. If the CJEU is to fully embrace the 
social model of disability, such considerations should not come into play. 
Under the social model, disability is any societal factor which imposes 
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restrictions on disabled people. Thus the correct focus of any future CJEU 
decision concerning the definition of disability for the purposes of the 
Framework Directive should be to examine what factors limit the 
individual in question from participating fully and effectively in society. 
Focusing on the restricting factors of an individual’s impairment and 
examining degrees of severity, as was suggested in the HK Danmark (Ring 
and Skouboe Werge) case, merely undermines any attempt at effectively 
implementing the social model of disability into EU law. 
  
At some point in the future the question as to whether a minimum 
level of severity is required for the purposes of the Framework Directive 
will be addressed by the CJEU. The hope then must be that the CJEU 
recognize that PLHA, in common with other individuals with disabilities, 
are precluded from full and effective participation in professional life by 
not merely environmental or physical barriers but also by attitudinal and 
psychological ones. As such, a definition of disability which is firmly 
grounded in the social model needs to be adopted. Such a definition would 
recognize that an individual could be classified as “disabled” for the 
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purposes of the Framework Directive notwithstanding the fact that their 
condition does not functionally limit them in any way. The definition 
would also recognize the fact that individuals with disabilities are 
prevented from participating fully and effectively not just in professional 
life, but in all aspects of society. 
 
Conclusion 
 
To say that the law relating to HIV discrimination within the EU is 
complex would be an understatement. In an attempt to protect PLHA from 
discrimination, various pieces of legislation have been enacted. Whilst 
each has at its heart the objective of protecting PLHA from discrimination, 
the collective result is a multifaceted plethora of legislation often 
overlapping and sometimes contradictory. In order to decipher the possible 
legal protection afforded to PLHA, regard must be had to the UN 
Convention, European Union law, any applicable law of the individual 
member state and depending on the facts of the case, regard might also be 
had to the European Convention on Human Rights. The net result is that 
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many lawyers now struggle to comprehend the law as it relates to 
discrimination. That laws should be open, clear and accessible is a 
fundamental requirement of any legal system and one advocated by many 
leading jurists, for example Fuller (1969), Raz (1979) and Bingham 
(2011). This is especially important in an area such as discrimination in 
which the law should be accessible and interpretable to, often 
marginalized, lay people in order that they may utilize its protection. The 
current situation fails entirely in this regard. The EU has committed itself 
to combatting HIV. In order to do this, a clear and consistent legal 
framework in relation to, not only HIV, but disability as a whole needs to 
be implemented. The adoption of a coherent definition of disability 
grounded in the social model would ensure that PLHA are adequately 
protected from discrimination across the EU. In addition, it would 
constitute a significant step in tackling the high levels of stigma directed 
towards PLHA.  
 
The decision of the CJEU in HK Danmark (Ring and Skouboe 
Werge) represented the CJEU’s first opportunity to revisit the concept of 
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“disability” employed by the Framework Directive since the ratification of 
the UN Convention by the European Union in 2010. In this case, the CJEU 
conceptualized disability as being an impairment which, in interaction with 
various barriers, hinders the full and effective participation of an 
individual in professional life. The decision represents a welcome step in 
the direction of the social model but it also illustrates that the CJEU still 
has some way to go until a definition of disability primarily based upon the 
social model of disability is fully adopted. Future decisions of the CJEU 
need to build upon the decision in HK Danmark (Ring and Skouboe 
Werge) but also acknowledge that the question of disability is not solely 
concerned with an individual’s functional limitations. Some conditions, of 
which HIV is an example, impose limited functional limitations upon an 
individual. Certainly if the concept of disability is solely concerned with 
functional limitations which restrict an individual’s ability to fully 
participate in professional life, then it is questionable whether PLHA will 
gain the protection of the Framework Directive. This would be an 
unfortunate outcome, given the marginalized nature of large numbers of 
PLHA within the European Union. Thus, it is hoped that in future the 
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CJEU broaden the concept of disability for the purposes of the Framework 
Directive to encompass individuals who are prevented from participating 
fully and effectively in society and not just professional life.  
 
It must also be hoped that the CJEU does not impose a requirement 
for an impairment to have a minimum degree of severity before it can be 
classified as a “disability”. The CJEU must recognize that the barriers 
which hinder the full and effective participation of disabled people in 
professional life go beyond just the environmental or physical but include 
attitudinal and psychological barriers. As such, a definition of disability 
which is firmly grounded in the social model needs to be adopted. Such 
amendments to the concept of disability would have far reaching beneficial 
consequences for not just PLHA but all individuals with disabilities across 
the European Union. 
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